What is carried interest in private equity?
In private equity, the relationship between a manager and its investors generally spans many years. Over that period, the manager selects companies, supports their development, implements value creation strategies and then organises their exit. But how can investors be sure that the manager's decisions serve their interests over the long term? This is precisely one of the functions of carried interest.
Definition and how carried interest works
Carried interest is a variable remuneration mechanism that allows the manager of a private equity fund, or its designated beneficiaries, to receive a share of the profits generated by the fund. The logic is simple: the more value is created for investors, the higher the manager's potential remuneration can be.
Among the costs of private equity, carried interest holds a particular place. Unlike recurring remuneration, it is directly tied to the profits generated by the fund and therefore acts as a performance incentive.
In many funds, carried interest represents 20% of eligible profits. The remaining 80% goes to investors. This split, known as the 80/20 split, is a historical benchmark in private equity, although other rates may apply. Carried interest is not, however, automatic remuneration. Its payment depends on the fund's performance and on the contractual distribution terms.
How does carried interest remunerate private equity managers?
Private equity traditionally distinguishes two categories of players:
- Limited Partners (LPs): the investors who provide the fund's capital.
- The General Partner (GP): the manager, or the entity responsible for steering investments, developing the portfolio and organising exits.
LPs expect to be rewarded for the risk taken on their capital. The GP seeks to create value through its investment expertise and its support of companies. Carried interest aims to bring these two objectives closer together. When the portfolio gains value and profits are actually realised, the manager can share in the wealth created. But when results fall short, its variable remuneration may be reduced, or even nil.
The fundamental idea is therefore to make part of the manager's remuneration depend on the economic success of investors.
Why does carried interest help align interests?
In listed markets, investors can generally buy or sell securities on organised markets. Private equity works differently. Capital is locked in for several years, holdings are not priced daily and value creation depends largely on the manager's decisions. Investors therefore delegate significant responsibility to the manager.
A relationship built on the long term
A closed-end private equity fund can have a life of ten years, sometimes longer. Over this period, the manager is involved at several stages:
- It identifies companies with development potential.
- It analyses their fundamentals and outlook.
- It negotiates the investment terms.
- It supports management teams through their transformations.
- It prepares the conditions for exit and for the realisation of value.
The fund's success therefore depends not only on the price at which companies were acquired, but also on the manager's ability to support them and to organise their sale. Carried interest seeks to anchor the manager's remuneration in this same timeframe.
A mechanism that brings interests closer together, without making them identical
Alignment of interests does not mean that the manager and investors bear exactly the same risks. Investors commit their capital and can suffer significant losses. The manager can lose the benefit of its variable remuneration without necessarily suffering an equivalent financial loss, except where it also invests its own capital.
This distinction is essential. Carried interest is an economic incentive, but its effectiveness also depends on the quality of governance, the structure of the fund and the protections granted to investors.
Key takeaways
- Carried interest gives the manager a share of the profits realised by the fund, often 20%.
- It brings the interests of the manager and investors closer together, without making them identical.
- Its effectiveness depends on the calculation, the payment timing and the contractual protections.
The hurdle rate: putting investors first
Carried interest is often associated with a second mechanism: the hurdle rate. It plays an important role in organising how profits are shared.
Definition: what is a hurdle rate?
The hurdle rate is a priority return threshold that investors must reach before the manager can benefit from certain carried interest distributions. In many buyout funds, this threshold is set at around 8% per year. It can however vary by strategy and by fund, or even be absent.
An 8% hurdle rate does not mean that the investor is guaranteed an 8% return. It sets a contractual priority in the sharing of profits, not a promise of performance.
Why does this threshold help align interests?
Let's consider two situations.
First scenario: the fund's performance is insufficient. If the return achieved does not satisfy the hurdle rate, the manager receives no carried interest, in a structure where this threshold fully conditions its payment.
Second scenario: the fund exceeds the priority return. Investors first benefit from the priority set out in the contract. The manager can then share in the profits under the terms defined.
The hurdle rate thus ranks distributions. The aim is not simply for the fund to make money, but for investors to first receive a priority level of return before the manager shares in the profits.
How is the hurdle rate calculated?
The calculation depends on each fund's own rules. It may take into account the capital actually paid in, the length of time it was deployed and the distributions already made.
It is therefore important to distinguish the hurdle rate from the IRR, or internal rate of return, which measures the annualised return of an investment while taking the timing of cash flows into account. An 8% hurdle rate and an 8% IRR are not necessarily interchangeable notions.
How is carried interest calculated? A worked example
The principle of carried interest is easier to grasp with a worked example. Take a fund that has invested €100 million. At the end of its investments and exits, it has €160 million to distribute. The fund has therefore created €60 million of profit, under our simplified assumption.
Suppose it provides for 20% carried interest, with no hurdle rate or catch-up.
| Breakdown | Amount |
|---|---|
| Investors' initial capital | €100m |
| Total amount to distribute | €160m |
| Profit realised | €60m |
| 20% carried interest | €12m |
| Profit retained by investors | €48m |
| Total returned to investors | €148m |
In this example, the manager receives €12 million of carried interest and investors recover €148 million. The manager's variable remuneration therefore rises with the profits realised. But this example does not take into account the priority return or the distribution terms, which can significantly change the result.
What if the fund has a hurdle rate?
Take a fund that invests €100 million and returns €160 million five years later, with no interim distributions. With a priority return of 8% per year, compounded, investors must receive about €146.9 million before the excess can start to be shared, under this assumption.
About €13.1 million then remains. If the fund provides for 20% carried interest on this excess alone, with no catch-up, the manager will receive about €2.6 million. This is very different from the €12 million in the first example. This structure corresponds to a hard hurdle, which ILPA recommends in its Principles 3.0: carry applies only to the portion of profits above the priority return.
A 20% carried interest therefore does not necessarily mean that the manager receives 20% of all of the fund's profits. Everything depends on the calculation terms. This is precisely why the structure of carried interest deserves as much attention as its rate.
Understanding how carried interest is calculated is therefore essential to decode the costs of private equity and, more specifically, how the value created is shared between the manager and investors.
Key takeaways
- A 20% carry does not always mean 20% of all profits: everything depends on the hurdle rate and the catch-up.
- In the example, the same fund pays €12m of carry with no hurdle rate, versus about €2.6m with an 8% priority return.
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The waterfall: organising how value is shared
The waterfall defines the order in which distributions are allocated between investors and carried interest beneficiaries. It is the contractual architecture of profit sharing.
The four steps of a distribution waterfall
In a common model, the waterfall has four main steps.
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1. Return of capital | Investors recover the capital covered by the waterfall, in line with the contractual provisions. |
| 2. Priority return | Where the fund provides for a hurdle rate, investors then receive the priority return to which they are entitled. |
| 3. Catch-up | A catch-up phase may allow the manager to reach its contractual share of profits. |
| 4. Sharing of additional profits | The remaining amounts are then split according to the agreed key, for example 80% to investors and 20% to the manager. |
This sequence defines precisely who receives what, and when.
The catch-up: why does the manager benefit from a catch-up?
The catch-up is a mechanism that applies after the priority return has been paid. It allows the manager to temporarily receive a larger share of distributions in order to reach the overall sharing level set by the fund.
In a full catch-up, the manager can receive 100% of the distributions in this phase, until it reaches the contractual proportion of profits to which it is entitled. This does not mean that it will keep 100% of subsequent distributions. Once the catch-up is complete, the usual split resumes.
The catch-up matters because it determines how the priority given to investors fits together with the manager's variable remuneration. Two funds with the same carried interest rate can therefore have different economics.
European and American waterfalls: two approaches to aligning interests
Not all funds trigger carried interest at the same time. Two main approaches coexist.
The whole fund model: reasoning at portfolio level
The model known as the European waterfall, or whole fund, looks at the fund's overall performance. In its classic form, the manager receives carried interest only once the conditions for return of capital and priority return are met at fund level. ILPA presents it as best practice, and in Europe carry is commonly paid on this basis, according to Invest Europe.
This approach favours an overall view of value creation. A particularly successful holding is not necessarily enough to trigger variable remuneration if other investments in the portfolio still show losses or significant risks. The manager is thus encouraged to consider the performance of the portfolio as a whole.
The deal-by-deal model: paying for completed deals
The model known as the American waterfall, or deal-by-deal, allows the manager to receive carried interest from the profits realised on certain deals, before all holdings have been sold.
This mechanism can speed up the payment of variable remuneration. It does, however, introduce a risk: the first deals may be very profitable while the last ones disappoint. The manager could then have received more than the overall performance ultimately justifies. This is why this model generally comes with specific contractual protections.
The difference between these two approaches is therefore not only about the timing of remuneration: it also shapes how the interests of the manager and investors converge over the life of the fund.
Clawback and escrow: how to protect the alignment of interests
Carried interest is designed to reward value creation. But that value must actually be realised and properly shared. Two mechanisms play an important role here.
The clawback: correcting carried interest that was too high
A clawback clause provides that a carried interest beneficiary may be required to return part of the sums already received when the fund's final results do not justify keeping them.
Take an example. A fund makes several highly profitable exits early in its life. The manager receives carried interest. A few years later, the last holdings are sold at significant losses. The overall performance may then be lower than what was expected when the first distributions were made.
The clawback makes it possible to correct any overpayments under the terms set out in the contract. It helps prevent the manager from keeping variable remuneration that is disproportionate to the final results.
The escrow: securing potential repayments
An escrow is a holding mechanism. It involves temporarily keeping part of the carried interest in a dedicated reserve. If a repayment becomes necessary, the sums available can make it easier to meet the contractual obligations.
An escrow does not on its own guarantee that all amounts will be recovered, but it strengthens the safeguards. ILPA recommends significant reserves, for example 30% of distributed carry or more. These mechanisms are a reminder of an essential principle: alignment of interests does not rely only on a performance incentive. It also requires rules that make it possible to correct any imbalances.
Key takeaways
- The whole fund model triggers carry at portfolio level, deal-by-deal does so deal by deal.
- The clawback corrects an overpayment, the escrow secures its repayment.
- The GP commitment exposes the manager to financial risk, which carry alone does not.
Does carried interest really encourage long-term value creation?
This is one of the central questions. By linking part of the manager's remuneration to the fund's profits, carried interest seeks to encourage decisions that create value.
In private equity, this value creation can take several forms: revenue growth, margin improvement, international expansion, add-on acquisitions, operational transformation or stronger governance. Carried interest encourages the manager to seek an increase in the economic value of its holdings. But the quality of this alignment depends on several parameters.
The timing of remuneration
Carried interest paid late, after a significant share of the investments has been realised, ties remuneration more closely to the portfolio's final outcome. Conversely, early payment can create a gap between profits already recorded and risks still present.
The level of risk accepted
Remuneration indexed to profits can also encourage risk-taking. The manager potentially benefits from a share of the upside, without necessarily bearing a proportionate share of the losses. Hence the importance of risk analysis, diversification, governance rules and investor protection mechanisms.
The quality of value creation
Finally, not all performance is equal. A rise in valuation that is still theoretical does not carry the same weight as a capital gain actually realised on a sale. How the fund determines the profits eligible for carried interest is therefore essential.
The aim is to tie variable remuneration to the value actually created and returned, rather than to mere expectations of performance.
GP commitment: when the manager invests too
Carried interest can be complemented by another alignment mechanism: the GP commitment. It refers to the capital invested by the manager, its executives or certain members of its team in the fund they manage. ILPA recommends that the GP hold a substantial equity interest in the fund, paid in cash.
This time, it is not variable remuneration but a financial investment. The manager is itself exposed to the portfolio's performance. When investments rise, it benefits from the gains on the capital it has committed. In the event of losses, it also bears part of the financial risk.
This direct stake reinforces the idea that the manager's decisions have economic consequences for itself. The amount of the GP commitment varies by fund and by management team. It is not, on its own, a guarantee of good management, but it is an additional element in assessing alignment of interests.
Talk to our teams about analysing managers and their terms.
How to assess the quality of a carried interest structure
The headline rate is not enough to understand the quality of the alignment. A 20% carried interest can cover very different realities from one fund to another. Several dimensions therefore deserve particular attention.
- The trigger threshold. Is there a hurdle rate? How is it calculated? Do investors benefit from a distribution priority?
- The calculation scope. Is carried interest determined across the whole fund or on certain deals?
- The catch-up. Does the mechanism include a catch-up phase? What are the economic consequences?
- The payment timing. When can beneficiaries receive their variable remuneration?
- The protections. Does the fund include clawback clauses or escrow mechanisms?
- The manager's financial commitment. Does the management team also invest its own capital?
These elements are not an automatic scorecard. They help to understand a fund's economic logic and how the interests of its different stakeholders are organised. To find the definition of each term, see our private equity and private markets glossary.
The Private Corner approach: alignment of interests at the heart of selection
At Private Corner, we believe that the analysis of a private equity fund cannot be limited to its investment strategy or its track record. How the interests of the manager and investors are structured is also an important part of the analysis.
Carried interest, the waterfall, contractual protections and the financial commitment of the teams all contribute to this understanding. Our role is notably to select institutional managers and to structure access to their strategies for intermediated private clients, with particular attention to transparency and performance reporting.
Private Corner does not charge any additional carried interest at the level of its feeder funds. The underlying funds may, however, provide for their own carried interest mechanism, in accordance with their documentation.
This distinction is part of our approach: allowing access to institutional strategies while preserving, as far as possible, the value created by the underlying funds.
Conclusion – Carried interest, much more than profit sharing
Carried interest is one of the most characteristic mechanisms of private equity. It rests on a strong idea: linking the manager's variable remuneration to the value created for investors.
But behind a rate often summarised as 20% lies a more complex architecture, made up of priority returns, distribution waterfalls, catch-up mechanisms and contractual protections. It is this architecture that determines the real quality of the alignment.
Carried interest is therefore not only a way of rewarding performance. It is also a way of organising the economic interests of those who invest and those who manage, over a long-term horizon. And in private equity, where today's decisions produce their effects over many years, this alignment is a key issue.
The 20% and 8% figures describe common market practice in private equity, not rules. The worked examples are illustrative and simplified.
(Source: Invest Europe, Guide to Private Equity and Venture Capital for Pension Funds; ILPA, Principles 3.0, 2019. Summary and editorial analysis by Private Corner.)
FAQ – Everything you need to know about carried interest
What is carried interest?
Carried interest is a variable remuneration that allows the manager of a private equity fund to receive a share of the profits generated, according to the fund's contractual terms.
Why does carried interest help align interests?
Because it ties part of the manager's remuneration to the economic results obtained for investors. Its effectiveness does, however, depend on the calculation terms, the payment timing and the contractual protections.
Is carried interest always 20%?
No. A 20% rate is common in private equity, but other levels may apply depending on the fund, the strategy and the terms negotiated.
What is a hurdle rate in carried interest?
The hurdle rate is a priority return threshold that must be met before certain carried interest distributions. It does not represent a guaranteed return for investors.
What is a catch-up?
The catch-up is a phase that allows the manager to receive an increased share of distributions once the priority return has been met, until the agreed contractual split is reached.
What is the difference between a European waterfall and an American waterfall?
The former generally operates at fund level, while the latter may allow carried interest to be paid on individual investments before the portfolio is fully liquidated.
What is a clawback?
A clawback is a clause that allows part of the carried interest already paid to be reclaimed when the fund's final results reveal an overpayment.
Does carried interest guarantee good alignment of interests?
No. It is an incentive mechanism, but its effectiveness depends in particular on the waterfall, the hurdle rate, the contractual protections, the distribution timing and the fund's governance.
Is carried interest part of the costs of private equity?
Yes. Carried interest is a variable component of private equity managers' remuneration. It differs from recurring fees in being conditional: its payment depends on the profits realised and on the fund's contractual terms.
The worked examples are illustrative and simplified, and the mechanisms described vary by fund and by contractual documents. Disclaimer: this document is for information purposes only, is intended for wealth management professionals and is issued by Private Corner, a management company authorised by the AMF (GP-20000038). It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to subscribe. Investments in private markets involve risks including loss of capital, illiquidity and valuation risk. Past performance and forecasts are not a reliable indicator of future results.